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Because defendant

filed no timely motion to withdraw his pleas and has not argued
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, he has waived
this claim on direct appeal.

State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566,

570 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 580-82 (Utah
App. 1992).
2.

Can defendant prevail on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim where he does not argue that counsel's performance
prejudiced his case, or, alternatively, where the record either
contradicts his claims of deficient performance or contains no
facts to overcome the strong presumption that counsel provided
constitutionally sufficient representation?

Defendants claim

presents a question of law reviewed on the trial record because
he presents the claim for the first time on direct appeal without
a prior evidentiary hearing.

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,

175 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In two separate informations, the State charged defendant
with distributing a controlled substance and with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, both second
2
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the statutory prison

terms for both crimes -- one to fifteen years for distributing a
counterfeit controlled substance, and not more than five years
for attempted possession of a counterfeit controlled substance
with intent to distribute -- and ordered the sentences to run
concurrently (R. 47, 123, 160). Defendant timely filed his
notices of appeal (R. 48-49) -1

STATEMENT 0? FACTS
The State accused defendant of selling methamphetamine to an
undercover narcotics agent and of possessing methamphetamine
secreted in a car defendant was driving (R. 9, 67).2 Defendant
denied the substance was methamphetamine, explaining it was a
composite mixture of over-the-counter drugs (R. 142-45).3
Consistent with this explanation, defendant agreed to plead
guilty to one count of distribution of a counterfeit controlled
substance, based on the sale to the undercover agent, and one

x

The notice of appeal for trial court case no. 941900597 is
inexplicably missing from the record. However, the State's file
contains a copy, served on it by this Court, which shows a timely
file stamp from the Third District Court. See addendum B.
2

Police found the methamphetamine in hidden compartments in
containers found in the car (R. 67) .
3

The field test showed the substance was methamphetamine (R.
9, 156-57). The State did not concede that it was a counterfeit
substance; it agreed to amending the information solely to
facilitate the plea bargain.
4

count of attempted possession of a counterfeit controlled
substance with the intent to distribute it, based on discovering
the substance in the car he was driving (R. 135-39)•

In

exchange, the State agreed to allow defendant to plead to the
lesser included attempt charge, moved to dismiss the two
misdemeanor charges, and moved to dismiss two additional cases
filed against defendant (R. 139-40).
In his plea affidavits and at the plea colloquy, defendant
admitted he had sold and had attempted to possess a counterfeit
substance purported to be methamphetamine (R. 33, 105, 137-38) .
During the plea colloquy, the trial court cautioned defendant
that he had only thirty days from the date of his pleas to file a
motion to withdraw them, and admonished him that the motion "will
not automatically be granted unless you can show good cause" (R.
139) .
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts.

SUMMARY OF THE ARSUMENT
1.

Guilty pleas.

Defendant makes several appellate

challenges to his guilty pleas. However, defendant presented
none of his challenges to the trial court in a timely motion to
withdraw his pleas, even though the trial court warned him of the
thirty-day time limit to file his motion.
5

On appeal, defendant

has argued neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances.
Defendant has therefore failed to provide this Court with a basis
for reaching the merits of his claims and is relegated to
litigating them in a petition for post-conviction relief.
2.

Ineffective assistance.

Defendant also claims his

trial counsel represented him deficiently in the plea process.
However, defendant has not established that, but for the
deficiencies he claims, there exists a reasonable probability
that he would not have pleaded guilty.

His failure to prove this

necessary element independently defeats his claim.

Alteratively,

the existing record either contradicts his claims of deficient
performance, or is insufficient to enable this Court to review
them on direct appeal.

Therefore, defendant has failed to meet

his burden of providing record evidence to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel rendered constitutionally sufficient
performance.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S FAILURES TO FILE A TIMELY MOTION TO
WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS AND TO ARGUE OR ESTABLISH PLAIN
ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON APPEAL PRECLUDES
CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF HIS CHALLENGES TO HIS GUILTY
PLEAS
The trial court accepted defendant's pleas on July 18, 1994
6

(R. 40, 112-13).

On August 19, 1994, two days after the thirty-

day deadline expired, defendant moved to withdraw them (R. 43,
119).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995).

At the hearing on his

motion to withdraw, defendant claimed that he pleaded guilty in
order to buy time to investigate the case and locate witnesses
who would testify for him (R. 166, 168-69).
however, that he understood no

He also admitted,

%l

guarantee" existed that he could

withdraw his pleas during the thirty-day period (R. 166) . The
trial court denied defendant's motions (R. 46, 122, 125-26).4
On appeal, defendant contends that he did not enter knowing
and intelligent pleas because counsel led him to believe that
pleading guilty would buy him more time to investigate the case,
essentially repeating the argument he made to the trial court,
and because counsel failed to inform him that he could only
withdraw his pleas for good cause. Appellant's Brief at 10-12.5

4

The trial court denied the motions because: 1) defendant
filed them outside the thirty-day period; 2) defendant had
sufficient experience with the criminal justice system to
understand what he was doing when he pleaded; and 3) defendant
knowingly pleaded guilty and established no good cause for
withdrawing his pleas (R. 125-26)•
defendant fails to support these factual allegations with
any record citations, as required by rule 24(a)(9), and the
record contains no evidence to support them. The State addresses
trial counsel's performance in Point II of this brief.
7

Defendant also challenges the validity of his pleas on several
grounds he never presented to the trial court, even in his
belated motions to withdraw his pleas: 1) that the trial court
failed to inform him of all of the necessary elements of
attempted possession with the intent to distribute; 2) that the
trial court failed to ask him to state the factual basis for the
crime in his own words; and 3) there was no sufficient factual
basis for defendant's plea because he consistently maintained
that he was selling something other than methamphetamine.
Appellant's Brief at 12-16.
Defendant cannot challenge his guilty pleas on direct appeal
without first preserving his challenges in a motion to withdraw
his pleas filed in the trial court.

State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d

1064, 1067 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311
(Utah 1987).

Defendant must move to withdraw his guilty pleas

within thirty days after entering them.
6(2) (b) (1995).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-

Because the trial court informed defendant of

the thirty-day limit and because defendant still filed his
motions outside that period, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to hear the motions,

gtate v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah

8

App. 1992) .6
As a result of his default in the trial court, defendant
must establish either that the trial court committed plain error
in accepting his guilty pleas, or that exceptional circumstances
require reaching the merits of his claims before this Court may
consider them on the merits.

State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1311;

State v. Price. 837 P.2d at 580-81. However, defendant fails to
argue, let alone establish, either; instead, he presents his
challenges to his guilty pleas as though he properly presented
them to the trial court.
Because defendant did not present his claims to the trial
court in a timely motion to withdraw and has not established or
even argued plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court
cannot consider the merits of his claims on direct appeal.

State

v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569-70 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to
consider two challenges to Jennings' guilty plea because he did
not present them to the trial court and did not argue plain error

6

The trial court denied defendant's motion as untimely (R.
125-26). Nevertheless, the trial court also considered the
merits of defendant's motion, and alternatively denied the motion
because defendant failed to establish good cause to justify
withdrawing his plea (id.). However, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to reach the merits of defendant's motion, and its
ruling on the merits has no effect, state y. Price. 837 P.2d at
581-82.
9

or exceptional circumstances on appeal); State v. Price. 837 P.2d
at 580-81.

Defendant is therefore relegated to a petition for

post-conviction relief to address the merits of these claims.
£&& State Y, Johnson/ 856 P.2d at 1067 & n.2.

Point II
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ANY PREJUDICE CAUSED
BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE DEFEATS HIS INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM; ALTERNATIVELY, THE RECORD
EITHER CONTRADICTS HIS CLAIMS OR IS INADEQUATE TO
REVIEW THEM ON DIRECT APPEAL
In order to establish he did not receive the level of
representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, defendant has
the burden of establishing two elements.

First, he must identify

the specific acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521
(Utah), cert, denied. 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994).

This element

requires defendant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel
rendered constitutionally sufficient assistance.

Strickland v.

Washington. 466 U.S. at 690; Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 522.
Second, defendant must affirmatively prove w'a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's error, he . • . would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v.
10

Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

Defendant must establish that the claimed ineffective
assistance is a "demonstrable reality;" he cannot rely on mere
speculation.

Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 526; Fernandez V»

Cook. 870 P.2d at 877 (Utah 1993).

Because there has been no

prior evidentiary hearing, defendant must establish both elements
on the trial record.

State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d at 175.

Defendant has not argued# let alone established, how any of
trial counsel's acts or omissions led him to plead guilty when he
would not have otherwise.

Defendant's failure even to argue this

critical element independently defeats his ineffectiveness claim.
£&& State V. BJShPP, 753 P.2d 439, 489 (Utah 1988) ("»[t]his
Court will not engage in constructing arguments out of whole
cloth on behalf of defendants1n) (citation omitted).
Alternatively, the trial record either contradicts his
claims or lacks sufficient facts to enable this Court to review
them on direct appeal.

State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah

App.), certf denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); State v. Johnson.
823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991).7

Defendant first contends that

7

Although he does not cite to it to support his factual
assertions, defendant has attached a copy of the affidavit he
submitted to this Court in support of his motion for remand
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That
11

trial counsel performed deficiently by not informing him that he
could plead guilty to attempted possession with intent to
distribute only if he knowingly and intentionally attempted to
possess a controlled or counterfeit substance.8

The existing

record does not support defendant's argument.
In order to be guilty of attempted possession with intent to
distribute, defendant had to intend to possess the counterfeit

affidavit is not a part of the trial record. Additionally,
because it represents defendant's self-serving and untested
statements, defendant cannot rely on it to support his factual
assertions. Therefore, the State asks that the Court order it
stricken from defendant's brief.
8

Defendant faults counsel for failing to inform him of the
elements of the crime to which he was pleading, but fails to
identify the specific deficiency about which he complains.
Appellant's Brief at 18. However, defendant challenged the
validity of his guilty plea to attempted possession with intent
to distribute because the plea affidavit and colloquy failed to
inform him that he could only "knowingly and intentionally"
attempt to possess the counterfeit methamphetamine. Appellant's
Brief at 13. Presumably, this also defines the scope of his
challenge to counsel's performance. If defendant intended a
different argument, the brief gives no hint of what it might be;
therefore, defendant has not preserved any other challenge to
trial counsel's performance in informing him about the nature and
elements of the crime. Qs& Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v.
Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984)(refusing to consider a
issue that Amicone supported with no legal authority or
analysis).
Furthermore, this argument refers only to defendant's guilty
plea to attempted possession and has no effect on his guilty plea
to distribution of a counterfeit substance.
12

methamphetamine; that is, he had to have the ''conscious objective
or desire" to possess it.

See State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 843

(Utah 1992) (a person cannot be guilty of an attempted crime
without the conscious objective or desire to commit the crime).
The record fails to support even defendant's broad assertion that
trial counsel failed to inform him of the requisite mental state;
it is just as likely that counsel fully explained to defendant
that he could not plead to attempted possession unless he
actually intended to posses the counterfeit methamphetamine.9
Moreover, this record contains no facts to overcome the
presumption that trial counsel represented defendant competently.

£&£, erg»/

Parsons v, Barnes, 871 p.2d at 522. specifically,

nothing in this record suggests that defendant contested that he
did not intentionally attempt to possess the counterfeit
methamphetamine or that his discussions with trial counsel
provided her with information suggesting that he claimed he only
unknowingly or involuntarily possessed the counterfeit substance.
£££ Strickland. 466 U.S. at 691 ("what investigation decisions
are reasonable depends critically on [information supplied by the

Admittedly, the trial court did not include ^intentional"
in its plea colloquy, and * intentional'' did not appear in the
plea affidavit (R. 105, 137-38). Nevertheless, the record
contains no evidence about what counsel explained to defendant.
13

defendant]")-

To the contrary, the record supports concluding

that defendant intentionally possessed the substance with the
intent to distribute it: at the hearing on his motion to withdraw
his pleas, defendant admitted selling the substance, asserting
only that he had never represented it to be methamphetamine (R.
144-45).
Defendant next complains that counsel failed to ensure that
the plea he signed was correctly stated.10

The argument fails to

recognize that an attempt to commit a crime necessarily
incorporates intent as the requisite mental state.
Vigil. 842 P.2d at 84 8.

State v.

Counsel may have considered the

statement of the elements adequate in light of this requirement.
As noted above, counsel may also have informed defendant of this
requirement even though it was not separately stated in the plea
affidavit and plea colloquy.

Without a record exploring why

counsel did not challenge the absence of "intent" as a separately
stated element, defendant has not established that counsel
performed deficiently.
Defendant also claims counsel should have argued the absence

10

Again, the argument presumably refers to the absence of a
separately stated intent element in the attempted possession plea
and affects only defendant's plea to that crime.
14

of a separately stated intent element in support of his motion to
withdraw his pleas.

For the reasons argued above, the record

contains no facts to establish that defendant contested this
issue.

Moreover, making the argument could not have changed the

outcome because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
motion in the first place.
(Utah App. 1992).

State v. Price. 837 P.2d at 581-82

Counsel does not perform deficiently by

failing or refusing to make futile motions.

See State v.

Malmrose, 649 p.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1982), overruled on other
grounds. State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986).
Defendant next contends his counsel performed deficiently by
filing his motions to withdraw his pleas two days after the
jurisdictional deadline, and asserts without record support that
he "timely" asked trial counsel to file the motions.
Brief at 18.

Appellant's

Contrary to defendant's unsupported assertion,

nothing in this record establishes when defendant requested
counsel to file the motions.

If he waited until 4:55 p.m. on the

last day to file, he cannot lay the blame at counsel's door for
the late filing.

Defendant's vague and unsupported assertion

that he timely requested filing the motions fails to establish
deficient performance.
Defendant also claims counsel erroneously failed to inform
15

him that he could withdraw his plea only upon a showing of good
cause.

Again, defendant cites no record support for this

assertion, and the record contains none.

Moreover, even if

counsel did not personally inform defendant of the good cause
requirement, the trial court did before accepting defendant's
pleas, and defendant understood that he had no "guarantee" that
he could withdraw his pleas (R. 139, 166). Therefore, defendant
entered his guilty pleas with full knowledge of the good cause
requirement, and any omission by counsel cannot have affected
defendant's decision to plead guilty.

This claim of

ineffectiveness fails on the existing record.
Defendant next claims counsel erroneously advised him to
plead guilty because no witnesses would testify on his behalf.
Again, the record contains no support for this factual assertion.
Moreover, even if counsel had given this advice, the record
contains no facts that rebut the presumption trial counsel
rendered effective assistance.

The record does not specify any

witnesses defendant identified for counsel or what he told her
about them.

Any information defendant may have given to counsel

may have led her to conclude that she could not locate any
witnesses, that they would not testify, that they could not give
credible testimony, or that they had nothing to offer as a
16

defense for defendant.

See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 691 ("what

investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on
[information supplied by the defendant]").
Finally, defendant claims that trial counsel had a conflict
of interest at the time of the hearing on his motion to withdraw
his pleas.

In order to established that he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, defendant must show
that his trial counsel "actively represented conflicting
interests'' and that wan actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance."

Gardener v. Holden. 888 P.2d

608, 620 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland v, Washington, 466 u.s.
at 692 (1984)), cert, denied. 116 S. Ct. 97 (1995).
To support this claim, defendant asserts only that, because
trial counsel had represented him "ineffectively" prior to the
hearing on his motion to withdraw, she had a conflict at the
hearing generated by a natural reluctance to admit her prior
deficiencies.

Defendant cites no authority to support his claim

that this constitutes a conflict of interest sufficient to
deprive him of his right to conflict-free counsel; therefore, the
Court need not reach the merits of this claim.
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).

State v, Amicone.

Alternatively, the argument

fails because it rests entirely on defendant's other claims of
17

ineffectiveness that the existing record either contradicts or is
insufficient to allow this Court to review them on direct appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, the State requests that the
Court affirm defendant's convictions.

Oral Argument Requested
The State requests oral argument in this case.

Primarily,

the State requests oral argument to address any questions the
Court may have about the issues raised in the briefs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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(7) Each local authority shall pay for providing, training, and supervising
school crossing guards in accordance with this section.
History: C. 1658,41-6-20.1, enacted by L.
1662, eh. 61,1 S; 1664, eh. 66,1 1; 1664, eh.
160,1 63.
Amendment Notes. — The 1694 amendment by eh. 66, effective May 2,1664, deleted
•Before January 1,1993" from the beginning of
Suheeetion (2); deleted former Suheeetion
(2Xb), adding comparable language to the end
of Suheeetion (2Xt>, deletedformerSuheeetion
(3Xb), which provided for the maintenance of
reduced epeed achool sonesforetate highways
as required under Section 41-6-21; added a
proviso at the end of Suheeetion (SXbXii); added
Suheeetion (3Xc>, and made related changes.
The 1994 amendment by eh. 120, effective
May 2, 1994, deleted "(a) Before January 1,
1993" at the beginning of Subsection (2); ndmignated former Subsections (2XaXi) and

CXaXii) si Subsections (2Xa) and (2Xb); deletedformerSuheeetion (2Xb), the eubetanee of
which was incorporated into Suheeetion (2Xa)
by the addition of "after written aafurance by a
local authority that the local authority will
comply with Subsections (3) and (4)*; redeeig*
nated the subsections in Suheeetion (8) and
deleted former Suheeetion (8Kb), which read
"Notwithstanding Suheeetion (aXiiXB) the department ahall provideforthe maintenance of
reduced speed school aonesforstate highways
as required under Section 41-6-21"; substituted
•Department of Transportation* tor "Xransportation Commission11 in Subsection (6); and
made stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

ARTICLE 4
ACCIDENTS
41-6-29. Operator 9 ! duty at accident — Stop at accident —
Penalty.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Corpus delicti.
In order for the state to establish corpus
delicti, the state must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the person who left

the scene was in fact the driver of the vehicle
and not merely a passenger. State v. Hansen,
657 R2d 678 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license — Penalties.
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this etate if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
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(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor, or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the
time of the offense.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more
than 50 hours.
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may
order the person to obtain treatment at an sJcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation cozzunitted within six years
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a community-service work program for not less than 80 hours nor more
than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility.
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two
prior violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and
(7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for
violations committed after April 23,1990.

41-6-44
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(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than
2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term
closely supervised follow through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony
if at least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April
23,1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose afineof not less than
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours
nor more than 2,160 hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow through after the treatment.
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resultingfroma conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education,
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after
July 1,1993, have been completed;
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(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed
after July 1,1993.
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as
a prior conviction under Subsection (10).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
tinder Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under
Subsection (10), as the court would render in connection with applying
respectively, thefirst,second, or subsequent conviction requirements
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first,
second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior
conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall
stateforthe record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of
Section 41-6-45 as follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for
the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41*6-45 that is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and
(7).
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(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted
for the first time under Subsection (1); and
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any
subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed
within a period of six yearsfromthe date of the prior violation.
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based cm the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
History: L. 1941, eh. 52, I 84; C. 1843,
Amendment Notea. — The 1994 amend87-7-111; L. 1949, eh. 86,1 1; 1957, eh. 75, merit by cfa. 169, affective March 17, 1994,
I 1; 1967, ch. 98, f 2; 1969, ch. 107,1 2; 1977, added Subsection (3XaXiiXB), making related
eh. 968, | S; 1979, eh. S4S, I 1; 1981, eh. 63, chanfet, and euhatituted ^Section 53-3-223" for
I S; 1982, eh* 46, i 1; 1983, ch- 99,1 18; 19SS, "41-2-130" in Suheection (12 Xb).
eh, 108,1 1; 1983, ch, 183,1 S3; 1985, eh. 46,
The 1994 amendment by ch. 263, effective
I 1; 19S6, eh. 122,1 1; 1986, eh. 178, | 29; May 2, 1994, eubdivided Subjection (12Xa),
1987, eh. 1S8,1 87; 1987 (1st 8£.), eh. 8,1 2; substituted "63-3-223" for ^l-MSO" in Subeec1988, eh, 17,1 1; 1990, eh, 183, I 16; 1990, tion (12Xb), and made stylistic changes.
eh, 299,1 1; 1991, eh. 147,1 1; 1993, eh. 168,
This aection it aet out as reconciled by the
I 1; 1993, eh. 193, f 1; 1998, eh. 284,1 82; Office of Legislative Research and General
1994, eh. 159,1 1; 1994, eh, 263,1 1.
Counsel.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Searches.
tion of blood alcohol and the possible loss or
In a prosecutionfordriving under the influ- corruption of that evidence, justified a warrantence of alcohol, exigent circumstances, includ- leas search of defendant's home. City of Oram v.
fog the concern of the police about the diaaipa- Henrie, 868 R2d 1884 (Utah Ct App. 1994).

41-6-44.3, Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Failure to oomply with standards.
Failure to oomply fully with standards aatabKshed by the Department of Public Safety does
not necessarily make breath test avidenoe inadmissible. It simply means that the founds-

tion and validity of the avidenoe may not be
presumed, but rather that they will have to be
established in order for the avidenoe to be
admitted. Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d
443 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

41-6-44.6. Definitions — Driving with any measurable
controlled substance in the body — Penalties —
Arrest without warrant.
(1) As used in this taction:
(a) "Controlled substance* means any substance scheduled under Seetion 58-37-4.
(b) "Practitioner*has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2.
(c) "Prescribe* has the same meaning as provided in Section 68-37-2.
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as provided in Section 58-37-2.
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53-3-227. Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while license
denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked —
Penalties.
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in which his license
was issued and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as provided in this section.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation
specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based on his driving a motor vehicle while his license is
suspended, disqualified, or revoked for
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10;
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44;
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43;
(iv) a violation of Section 76-5-207;
(v) a criminal action that the person plead guilty to as a result of a
plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one
or more of the sections or ordinances under this subsection;
(vi) a revocation or suspension which has been extended under
Subsection 53-3-220(2); or
(vii) where disqualification is the result of driving a commercial
motor vehicle while the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended, canceled, or revoked under Subsection 53-3-414(1).
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based upon his driving a motor vehicle while his license
is suspended, disqualified, or revoked in his state of licensure for violations corresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (a).
(c) Afineimposed under this subsection shall be at least the maximum
fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301.
History: L. 1*33, ch. 45, t 29; C. 1*43,
*7-4-32; L. 1*83, ch. 99, f 8; 1*83, ch. 183,
I 27; C. 1*53, 41-2-28; renumbered by L.
1*87, c h 137, f 36; 1*88, ch. 209, f 20; 1*68,
Ch. 252, > 7; 1990, ch. 30, f 8; 1*91, ch. 241,
I 60; 1992, ch. 60,1 3; C. 1953, 41-2-136; renumbered by L. 1993, ch. 234, f 106.
Amendment Note*. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,1990, inaerted 'Violation of a" before local" in Subaection (SKaXiii);
aubetitutad "action" for "prohibition'' and inaerted "to" altar "guilty" in Subaection
(SXaXv); aubatituted "a revocation or suepenaion which*' for "wboee revocation or suspension" at the beginning of Subaection (3XaXvi);
and added Subaection (SXaXvii).
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, aubatituted "claae C"for"claw B" in Subeectionf (2) and (8Kb) and aubetitutad "claae B"
for "daae A" in Subaection (3Xa).

Tbe 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, aubatituted "or under the iawi of the
etate in which hie licenae wae iaeued and who
operate*" for "and operate*" in Subaection (1),
aubatituted "that" for "which" in Subaection
(SKaXiii), added present Subaection (3Xb), redesignated former Subaection (3Xb) aa present
Subaection (3XO, and aubatituted "at least" for
"in an amount not leas than" in Subaection
(8X0.
Ihe 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993,
renumbered thie section, which formerly appeared aa f 41-2-136, aubetitutad "drive" for
"operate" throughout, added "motor" in Subeectiona (SXa) and (b), and updated the section
citations to reflect the creation of Title 53.
Croee-Refereneea, — Sentencingformiademeanora, If 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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(10) Any person who obtains or attempts to obtain information from the
database by misrepresentation orfraudia guilty of a third degree felony.
(11) (a) A person may not knowingly and intentionally use, release, publish,
or otherwise make available to any other person or entity any information
obtainedfromthe databaseforany purpose other than those specified in
Subsection (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a third degree
felony and is also subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000.
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection
shall be in accordance with Section 68-1*108, regarding adjudicative
proceedings within the division.
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall be deposited in
the General Fund
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit information to the
database as required under this section after the division has submitted a
specific written request for the information or when the division determines the individual has a demonstrable pattern offoilingto submit the
information as required is grounds for the division to take the following
actions in accordance with Section 58-1-401:
(i) refuse to iaaue a license to the individual;
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license;
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license;
(iv) iaaue a public or private reprimand to the individual;
(v) iaaue a cease and desist order, and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each
dispensed prescription regarding which the required information is
not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties aaaeaaed under Subsection (aXvi) ahall be deposited
in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of thia aubaection
ahall be in accordance with Section 58-1*108, regarding adjudicative
proceedings within the division,
(IS) An individual who has submitted information to the database in
accordance with this section may not be held civilly liable for having submitted
the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to establish and
operate the database shall be funded by appropriationsfromthe General
Fund.
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any
resources within the Commerce Service Fund.
(15) All coata aaaociated with recording and submitting data aa required in
this aection ahall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet
History: C. 1*53,SS*7.7J, enacted by L.
lSS5,eh.SSM S.

Effective Dates. — Uws 1W6, eL 833,14
inakesths set effective sa July 1,1*9*.

58-37-8. Prohibited acta — Penalties(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
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(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (lXa) is guilty of afirstdegree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directlyfroma practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorised by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealedfromthose present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered orforgedprescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a Juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency;forpurposes
of this subsection, a juvenile
means a "child* as defined in Section
78-Sa-2, and "emergency9 means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substanceforimmediate relief of pain
cor suffering;

76-4-101

INCHOATE OFFENSES
Section
76-4-302.

spiracy to commit offense prohibited.

Conviction of inchoate and principal offense or attempt and con-

PARTI
ATTEMPT
76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.
History: C. 1953, 76*4-101, enacted by L.
197S, ch. 196,1 76-4-101.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
A conviction under H 76-4-101 and 76-6-202
for attempted burglary is not s conviction for an
offense which 'otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another" under 18 U.S.C.
{ 924(eX2XBXii)l providing for enhanced sentences, since attempted burglary convictions,
under Utah law, may include conduct well
outside Congress's target of "violent" felonies.
United States v. Strahl, 958 F£d 980 (10th Cir.
1992).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Attempted burglary.
—Enhanced sentence.
Attempted murder.
Attempt to receive stolen property.
Campaign contributions.
CommoD-iaw rule superseded.
Completed offense.
Culpability.
Instructions.
Intent.
Overt act
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Preclusion of the defense of impossibility by
toil section does not violate the due process
clsuse of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v.
Sommen, 669 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).
Attempted burglary.
—Enhanced sentence.
Congress did not intend implicitly to include
attempted burglary as a violent offense when it
specified burglary as a violent felony under 18
U.S.C. | 924(eX2XBXii), providing for enhanced sentences in certain circumstances.
United States v. Strahl, 956 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.
1992).

Attempted murder.
The crime of attempted murder requires
proof of intent to kill. Attempted murder does
not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to commit a crime requires
proof of an intent to consummate the crime.
Therefore, it follows that attempted felonymurder does not exist as s crime in Utah. State
•. Bell, 785 R2d 390 (Utah 1989).
In order to convict defendant of attempted
first degree murder, the state had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (i) she had the intent to kill or knowledge
that her acts would result in death if carried
out; (ii) the engaged in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward causing the death of
her husband; and (iii) she did so either (a) by
administering or attempting to administer a
poison or lethal substance or a substance ad-
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALTBB
_
. ,
Conditional plea.
OM
'

tion OD appeal of the purportedly preserved
issue would not have naeaasanly ended the
nroeecution of the case. State v. Montoya, 868
R2d 1027 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

Conditional plea.
lhal court ahould not have accepted a conditknal no contaat plea aince a fitvorabk reeolu-

Cfced in SUte •. Serr. 768 R2d 935 (Utah Ct
AZ?7S*8I
^^
***?' J*50'*

77-13-4. Felonies — Entry in open court.
All pleas in felony eases shall be entered by the defendant in open eourt and
the proceedings recorded.
History: C. 1958, 77-18-4, enacted by L.
1980, en, 15,1 2.

77-13-5. Failure to plead — Not guilty entered.
When a defendant does not enter a plea, the court ahall enter a plea of not
guilty for him.
History: C. 1958, 77-18-5, enacted by L.
1960, eh. 15,1 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Wairer.
One accused of crime could waive mere fornudity of entering plea of not guilty before

going to trial. State v. Eitei, 62 Utah 572,176
P. 271 (1918).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jxut. 2d. — 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law f 447.

CJJL — 22 C JB. Criminal Law | 878.
Key Numbers, —- Criminal Law «• 266.

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
History: C. 1958, 77*184, enacted by I*
1980, eh, 15, | 2; 1989, en, 66, f 1; 1994, ehII, I 1.

Amendment Notes, — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, substituted "Rule
65B"for«Rult 65R(ir in Subsection (8).
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SUPREME COURT

78-2-2

CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Section
7S-2-2.

Bujumtt Ooort jurisdiction.

78-2*2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to cany into efifect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(S) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court ofAppeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in fonwd ac^dicative proce^ings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer, or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subeerrtt (e);
(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional cm its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appealsfromany court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appealsfromthe district court involving a conviction of afirstdegree
or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3) (a) through (d).

78-2a-3

JUDICIAL CODE

6

(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3) (b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C IMS, 7 * 4 4 , enacted by L.
1986, ch, 47,1 41; 19S7, ch- 161,1 803; 1988,
eh, S4S, I 6; 1989, ch- 67,1 1; 199% ch, 197,
I 11; 1994, ch, 191,1 t; 1995, ch- 967,1 8;
1995, ch- 999,1 46.
Amendznant Note*. — Tha 1992 amendtoent, affective April 27,1992, is Subsection (4),
deleted fin-mar Subsections (e) and (f), which
read; "general water adjudication* and •taxation and revenue; and," respective]?, making
related change*; redesignated former Subsec-

tion (g) ai Subeection (e); and made stylistic
changes in Subeection (e).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
added Subsections (SXk) and (4Xe), making
related changes.
The 1995 amendments by ch. 267 and ch.
299, both effective May 1,1995, made the same
changes: they changed 'Board of State Lands
and Forestry" to 'School and Institutional Trust
Lands Board of Trustees" in Subeection
(BXeXiii) and added Subeection (BXaXvi).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appellate jurisdiction.
—Attachment.
—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Certiorari
Original Jurisdiction.
—Extraordinary writs.
Cited.

Certiorari
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction
granted by this section, the 8upreme Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the
parties should address the decision of the Court
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court
Butterfield v. Okubo, 631 R2d 97 (Utah 1992).

Appellate jurisdiction.

Originjd jurisdiction,

—Attachment
Although this section did not govern a land
conveyance because it was not in effect when
petitioner filed its writ of review, this section
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, because jurisdiction attached under the
statute in effect when the petition for review
was filed. National Parks A Conservation Aas'n
% Board of State Lands, 969 R2d 909 (Utah
1993).

—Extraordinary write.
Ike term •original" in Subsection (2) adds
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — and its absence in I 76»2a-3(l) takes
siothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals — because jurisdiction © w petitions
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition originally filed with it aa opposed to its appellate
jurisdiction over eases that originated elsewhere. Barnard v. Murphy, 682 E2d 679 (Utah
CtApp.1994).

ANAL«8

—FonnaJ adjudicative pmneortrnge.
Subdivision (SXeXiii) confers jurisdiction m
the Supreme Court only over final orders and
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 630 R2d 233 (Utah 1992).

Cited in Bute v. Humphrey, 823 R2d 464
(Utah 1991).

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
gtrtion
7S-2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

78-2a*3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court ofAppeals has jurisdiction to issue ai] extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:

Rule 2SA
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(2) Motions and other papere ahall be typewritten on opaque, unglazed
paper 8Vi by 11 inches in size. Paper may be recycled paper, with or
without deinking. The text ahall be in type not smaller than ten characters per inch. Lines of text ahall be double spaced and ahall be upon one
aide of the paper only. Consecutive sheets ahall be attached at the upper
left margin.
(S) A motion or other paper ahall contain a caption setting forth the
name of the court, the title of the case, the docket number, and a brief
descriptive title indicating the purpose of the paper. The attorney ahall
sign ail papersfiledwith the court with his or her individual name. The
attorney ahall give his or her business address, telephone number, and
Utah State Bar number in the upper left hand corner of the first page of
every paper filed with the court except briefs. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any paperfiledwith the court and state
the party's address and telephone number.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 emendment, effective October 1,1992, sdded the Subdivision (b) designation snd heading end sdded
Subdivision (c), redesignating the following
subdivisions accordingly end making a related
change in the Subdivision (s) heading, and
added "or reply" to the end of thefirstsentence
in Subdivision (d).

The 1994 amendment, in Subdivision (f),
substituted the eeoond throughfiftheentenoei
in Subdivision (1) for theformerfirsteentence,
which had required an original andfiveoopiee
in the Supreme Court and an original end four
oopiee in the Court of Appeals and had authorised the court to require additional copiei, end
added the eeoond eentence in Subdivision (2).

Rule 23A. Motion for reinstatement of appeal.
An appeal dismissed for failure to take a step other than the timelyfilingof
a notice of appeal may be reinstated by the court upon motion of the appellant
for (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or (b)fraud,misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time after entry of the order of dismissal.
(Added effective October 1, 1992.)

Rule 23B. Motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of counsel
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case
may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of
enteringfindingsof fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon an allegation of facts constituting
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully appearing in the record on appeal.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the
filing of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be
filed after oral argument Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23, The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal
that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits
shall also allege facta that ahow the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed
within 20 days after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10
days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court Upon consideration of the motion, affidavits, and
memoranda, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of enteringfindingsof fact relevant to the dais
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that the
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attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the
court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained.
(d) Effect on appeal Oral argument and the deadlinesfin*briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties
or upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial court shall
conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter thefindingsof fact
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable
after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the
fact The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial
court shall enter written findings of fact.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court
has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon
the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the recordfromthe
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule
for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
Thefindingsof fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Allegation of facte required.
Becauae defendant did not allege any frcta in
support of hie ineffeetire aatiftance claim, the
appellate court would not remand the caae for
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper

to remind a claim under this rait for a fishing
expedition. State r. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578
(Utah Ct Asp.), cert denied, 060 P. 948 (Utah
1993).

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with
page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in
the trial court; or

Rule 24
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Amendment Noiaa. — Tbe 1995 amendment deleted a eecond eentence from Subdivi-
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man (bX3), relating to a request for an enlargeawnt of time greater than six days.

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant ahall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of tbe case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be aet out on a eeparate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with
page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
<4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in
the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for eofking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate
citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to
the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. A statement of the facta relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements offset and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of tbe brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum ia
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum ahall be bound as part of
the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum ahall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited intikebrief but not reproduced verbatim in the
brief;
(B) in eases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance
to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly
published reporter service; and
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(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum
decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or
document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the
appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may
be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a mininuiTn references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, 9or the
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee, * "the
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of
any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made to the
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is
in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal isfiled,the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall
then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of
contents, table of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by
permission of the court The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good
cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated
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for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall befiledin the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
0') Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995.)
Amendment Notes. — Tbe 1995 amendment added the provision for cases reviewed on
certiorari in Subdivirion (aXll); added the tecend sentence in Subdivision (f); and, in Subdi-

virion (g), added the 50-page limit, eubetituted
"apeUeeJeroaft-appeliant" for "appellee" in the
third sentence, and all the language beginning
with the fourth sentence.

Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs.
(a) Time for service and filing briefs. The appellant shall serve andfilea
brief within 40 days after date of noticefromthe clerk of the appellate court
pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposition of the appeal or
a motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of counsel has
been previously interposed, in which event service and filing shall be within
30 daysfromthe denial of such motion. The appellee, or in cases involving a
cross-appeal, the appellee/cross-appellant, shall serve and file a brief within
SO days after service of the appellant's brief In cases involving cross-appeals,
the appellant shall serve and file the second brief described in Rule 24(g)
within SO days after eervice of the appellee/cross-appellant's brief. A reply
brief may be served andfiledby the appellant or the appellee/cross-appellant
in cases involving cross-appeals. If a reply brief isfiled,it shall be served and
filed within SO days after the filing and service of the appellee's brief or the
appellant's second brief in cases involving cross-appeals. If oral argument is
scheduled fewer than 35 days after thefilingof appellee's brief, the reply brief
must befiledat least 5 days prior to oral argument. By stipulation filed with
the court, the parties may extend each of such periods for no more than 30
days in civil cases or 15 days in criminal cases. A motion for enlargement of
time need not accompany the stipulation. No such stipulation shall be effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be extended.
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. For matters pending in the
Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an original
signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters
pending in the Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which shall
contain an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals. Two copies shall be served on counsel for each party separately
represented.
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Judith A. Jensen
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Joe Rakes,
Defendant and Appellant.
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Case No. 940624-CA

Dear Ms. Jensen:
Please be advised that the notice of appeal in this case has
been filed with the Court of Appeals. The case number is 940624-CA
and should be indicated on any future filings.
If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within
the same period the appellant must file a certificate to that effect
with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken and a
copy with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
The request for transcript was made October 11, 1994. R.12(a)
allows the court reporter, Kathleen Schultz, 30 days to prepare the
transcript. As the appellant's counsel, and party requesting the
transcript, it is your responsibility to ensure the timely filing of
the transcript.
The Docketing Statement and attachments, consisting of the
original and three copies, is due within 21 days of the filing of
the notice of appeal in the trial court. Therefore, the docketing
statement is due November 1, 1994.
Please note, failure to perfect an appeal at any time during
the appeal process nay result in dismissal of the appeal.
Sincerely,

/ J a n i c e Hill
*
Deputy Clerk
cc: yJan Graham - Criminal Appeals Division
Kathleen Schultz
Third District, Salt Lake County #941900597
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JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JOE RAKES,

Case No. 941900597

Defendant/Appellant.

HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that JOE RAKES, Defendant/Appellant
in the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of
Appeals from the final judgment and conviction rendered against him
on the 19th day of September, 1994, by the Honorable John A. Rokich,
Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
DATED this tHA

day of October, 1994.

<

CM. tf&y

JUDITH A .

JENSEN

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
I CERTIFY THAT THIS
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
DISTRICT COURT. SALT
UTAH.

DEPUTY COURT

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JUDITH A. JENSEN, hereby certify that I have caused to
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; KATHY
SCHULTZ, Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and the Utah
Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, this ll+L

day of October, 1994.

JUDITH A. JENSEN/'

DELIVERED this \\

day of October, 1994.

